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et al., 1983; Reader and Laland, 2002, 2003a; Lefebvre et al., 2004). 
Animals and humans alike must trade-off the costs and benefits of 
behavioral change. To optimize this trade-off, individuals may seek 
and benefit from environmental and social cues that innovation is 
a possible and appropriate action. Here, we focus on social cues.
The level of performance of other individuals provides a plausi-
ble social cue that could guide behavioral change. For example, indi-
viduals may copy others based on the latter’s performance (Schlag, 
1998; Mesoudi, 2008; Offerman and Schotter, 2009). Furthermore, 
social information from the high performance of others provides a 
cue that one could perform better, raising the possibility that such 
social comparison can drive behavioral change and the adoption 
of innovations, particularly in novel environments where indi-
viduals may be uncertain of the rewards of an action (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985). Such social cues could initiate exploration, and 
simultaneously assist in the formation of expectations about the 
benefits of exploitation of novel behaviors. For example, in busi-
ness contexts, knowledge that others are making large profits could 
prompt research and development of more efficient production 
technologies; just as, in subsistence foraging contexts, seeing others 
return loaded with prey could promote novel hunting and gather-
ing strategies.
We tested the prediction that social information can increase 
the propensity of human participants to change their behavior, by 
exposing individuals to social cues of either low or high  performance 
IntroductIon
Novel behavior patterns – innovations – can provide benefits, such 
as the discovery of new resources or efficient ways to gather exist-
ing resources, but can also carry risks and costs, such as injury, 
predation, poisoning, the chance of failure, or a time investment 
to acquire or perfect the innovative action (Bandura, 1977; Meeus 
and Oerlemans, 2000; Reader and Laland, 2003a; Rogers, 2003). 
The costs and benefits of a novel behavior may be delayed, and thus 
unknown at the moment of innovation. This applies particularly to 
multistage problems where future outcomes are difficult to assess 
(Fang and Levinthal, 2009). Innovation is not per se beneficial, and 
so is likely to be flexibly employed depending on the state and cir-
cumstances of an individual, rather than simply or solely the result 
of a flash of creative inspiration. Evidence from both humans and 
non-human animals supports the view that innovation is a flex-
ibly employed response (reviewed in Reader and Laland, 2003a). A 
related literature has demonstrated that behavioral variability can 
be shaped by instruction or reward (Neuringer, 2002). Uncovering 
determinants of the discovery and utilization of innovations is 
important, since appropriate innovation, combined with cultural 
transmission, is pivotal to human accomplishment and survival 
(Richerson and Boyd, 2005; O’Brien and Shennan, 2010). Similarly, 
innovation in animals is a significant element of behavioral flex-
ibility, and has been linked to survival in changing or novel envi-
ronments, and to long-term evolutionary consequences (Wyles 
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(“low cued” versus “high cued”), or to no cues (“ without-cues”). 
These cues took the form of high-scores, ostensibly from previ-
ous participants. Participants then could explore a novel three-
dimensional computer environment with the overall goal to amass 
as many points as possible within a limited time. Participants knew 
that more points resulted in a higher payment at the end of the 
game. Points could be gained by making and repeatedly using novel 
discoveries. To draw parallels to research on cultural transmission, 
we term these discoveries “innovations” and their repeated use 
“adoption” or “exploitation” of an innovation. Innovations that 
individuals adopt and use repeatedly will be those most likely to 
spread through cultural transmission (Reader and Laland, 2003b).
In the computer environment, participants were faced with 
trade-offs between exploration and exploitation, since exploitation 
of an already discovered innovation provided points, but precluded 
further exploration that might have led to a still more profitable 
discovery. Many fields investigate exploration–exploitation trade-
offs, including work encompassing underlying neural and genetic 
mechanisms (March, 1991; Daw et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007; 
Frank et al., 2009). As Cohen et al. (2007) note, social cues are 
a potentially critical but understudied factor in determining the 
balance struck between exploration and exploitation.
Innovations were initially unknown to the participants and 
had to be discovered via costly trial and error, since actions cost 
time and points, and only particular combinations or sequences 
of actions resulted in rewards. For example, participants could 
discover that using two tools sequentially with a certain object 
resulted in a points gain, but if participants tried tools in the wrong 
sequence or with the wrong object they lost time and points. By 
allowing participants to explore a computer environment with all 
actions recorded, we could identify the first time an action sequence 
was performed (discovery of an innovation) and whether these 
sequences were repeated (exploitation of an innovation). There 
were three classes of innovation to be discovered that differed in 
complexity, and, within each class, four sub-innovations that used 
related techniques. Thus discovery of one sub-innovation could 
facilitate discovery of the other sub-innovations within the same 
class, since similar techniques could be applied. This could repre-
sent, for example, discovery of a novel food processing technique, 
which could then be applied to different foods. To be successful 
players had to both explore their virtual world and exploit the 
innovations they discovered.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Participants were 64 adult undergraduate students (30 females, 
M = 23.6, SD = 4.7 years) of Utrecht University and Hogeschool 
Utrecht, The Netherlands. Participants were recruited by posters 
and were paid on average 8.1 Euros (ca. $11.6 US, range 6–10 
Euros). We assigned participants randomly to the experimental 
treatments. Before beginning, written instructions were given 
and read to the participants, participants could ask questions 
aloud, and written informed consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants. Players could not ask questions during the actual game, 
but could ask questions regarding the post-game questionnaire 
in private. The procedures and questionnaires were approved by 
the Medical Ethics Review Committee (METC) of the Universitair 
Medisch Centrum (protocol number 06-672) and comply with the 
ethical guidelines of the APA and the principles expressed in the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
exPerIMental task
Participants played a computer game involving exploration of 
a virtual three-dimensional double T-maze. Two to six players 
played simultaneously in the same room, in private booths visually 
isolated from one another and wearing headphones so that other 
players’ key strokes were inaudible. Players were instructed that 
they had to collect as many points as possible in the upcoming 
20–30 min and that remuneration would depend on their score. 
Points could be scored by selecting one of four available tools and 
using them somewhere in the maze. A red box appeared on the 
screen in areas where objects were present on which tools could 
be used and potentially give points. There were four such areas, 
one located at the end of each of the four maze arms and marked 
by colored cone-shaped objects. Different tools carried different 
costs, just as “real world” tools might differ in the effort needed to 
use them. Each tool cost a certain number of points per use (3, 6, 
9, or 12), regardless of where or how it was used. Thus incorrect 
use of a tool cost points. Tools were pictured as arbitrary sym-
bols, with the four symbols randomly allocated to each tool for 
each player to eliminate any influence of consistent preferences 
for a particular symbol. Players could discover three ways to gain 
points, here termed “innovations,” which varied in their difficulty 
of discovery: (a) tool–object combinations: a specific tool used at a 
specific cone gave points (for example tool C had to be used at cone 
1); (b) tool–tool–object combinations: the tool–object innovation 
tool used on the appropriate cone followed by another specific tool 
used at the same cone gave points [innovation (b) thus builds on 
innovation (a); for example tool C then tool A had to be used at 
cone 1]; (c) object–object–object combinations; visits to three cones 
in a certain order, using any tool at each cone, gave points (for 
example cone 1 then 2 then 3 had to be visited in sequence, using 
any tool at each cone). To discourage players from using tools in 
rapid succession the recently activated cone became inactive for 
2 s after a tool was used there, visualized by the cone becoming 
gray. It took approximately 3–5 s for players to move directly from 
cone to cone. Players were informed how to select tools and move 
around the maze, that they began with 1000 points, that tools had 
costs, that tools could result in gains when the red box appeared, 
that gray indicated inactivity, and that the game would end if their 
points dropped to zero. They were otherwise unaware of how to 
gain points or the relative costs of the tools.
For each innovation, four “sub-innovations” existed. That is, 
for the tool–object combination there was one correct combina-
tion for each cone (e.g., the four sub-innovations could be tool 
C with cone 1, B with cone 2, A with 3, and D with 4). For the 
tool–tool–object combination there was one correct combination 
for each cone (e.g., the four sub-innovations could be tools C then 
A at cone 1, B then D at cone 2, A then B at 3, and D then C at 
4). For the object–object–object combinations, each sub-innovation 
included three different cone locations that had to be visited, and 
all cone locations were included three times in this innovation 
(e.g., the four sub-innovations could be to visit cone 1 then 2 then 
3, 4 then 2 then 1, 3 then 1 then 4, and 2 then 3 then 4). We could 
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(2007). We included gender, previous experience with computer 
games (self-reported on a 7 point Likert scale), and experimental 
treatment as independent variables and their two-way interactions. 
Gender and previous computer experience, however, had no sig-
nificant influence in any of our models and we thus report models 
that only include treatment as an independent variable. Significance 
tests of GLMs were conducted via F and χ2 statistics. For significant 
differences between treatments we report Cohen’s d for GLMs as 
effect size (equation 10, Nakagawa and Cuthill, 2007).
results
socIal cues of hIgh-PerforMance Increase PerforMance, 
asPIratIons, and actIvIty
Players exposed to high-performance cues scored significantly more 
points than those exposed to low performance or no cues [points, 
high cued: Mdn = 2093, median absolute deviation (MAD) = 1623; 
low cued: Mdn = 1337, MAD = 431; without-cues: Mdn = 1183, 
MAD = 753; GLM (quasipoisson errors, log link function): F(2, 
61) = 5.7; p = 0.005; see Table 1 for treatment contrasts]. Participants 
were asked to estimate their final scores prior to the game, and these 
estimates were significantly higher for high-cued and without-cue 
participants than low-cued participants [high cued: Mdn = 2700, 
MAD = 1038, range 600–10000; low cued: Mdn = 1168, MAD = 101, 
range 600–1500; without-cues: Mdn = 2000, MAD = 1482, range 
250–12000; GLM (quasipoisson errors, log link function): F(2, 
61) = 9.6; p < 0.001; Table 1]. Only one player in the low cued 
and one in the high-cued treatment estimated their score would 
be higher than the maximum high-score they observed on the 
posters. In fact, six low-cued and four high-cued players beat the 
maximum high-score they had observed. Activity, measured as the 
number of tool-activating keystrokes during the game, was signifi-
cantly higher when high cued than low cued, while the activity of 
thus examine how many innovations players discovered, and to 
what extent they explored and exploited a particular innovation’s 
“parameter space” (i.e., the sub-innovations).
The points received from a sub-innovation depended on how 
many innovations they previously had discovered and how often 
they already had exploited a particular sub-innovation. The first 
innovation discovered yielded 10 points, the second 100 points, and 
the third 1000 points. For example, an object–object–object innova-
tion would give 10 points if it was discovered before the tool–object 
and tool–tool–object innovations, 100 points if discovered after the 
tool–object innovation, and 1000 points if discovered last. Thus 
the third innovation discovered gave the most points, regardless 
of which innovation it was. Repeated use of a sub-innovation gave 
less and less points [calculated by multiplying the points gained 
(10, 100, or 1000) by (0.85s), where s is the number of uses of that 
sub-innovation], until the gains equaled the tool cost and zero 
points were received. The decline in reward with repeated use 
applied independently to each sub-innovation. For example, the 
second tool–object sub-innovation discovered would initially score 
10 points. Points gained were displayed on the screen directly after 
using a tool, colored green for gains and red with a minus symbol 
for losses. The game lasted exactly 20 min, after which participants 
completed a questionnaire, were paid in private, and debriefed.
exPerIMental ManIPulatIon
After instruction, we asked participants to guess how many points 
they would score. In two of the three experimental treatments 
we indicated two identical handwritten posters on the wall, and 
informed players they were the top 10 previous scores of inexperi-
enced players to provide an orientation of how many points others 
scored in earlier sessions. We constructed the scores to manipulate 
the available social information on past performance. In the low-
performance cues experimental treatment (n = 21), the presented 
scores ranged from 958–1453 points, compared with 2711–4112 
points in the high-performance cues treatment (n = 21). The scores 
were distributed evenly with small random deviations. To achieve 
the top score in the low-performance treatment players needed to 
discover at least two innovations, whereas in the high-performance 
treatment all three innovations had to be discovered. In the control 
treatment players saw no posters (n = 22). Since the instructions 
mentioned 1000 starting points, players in the control treatment 
had an indication of the scale on which points were measured. The 
maximum possible score was approximately 40000.
analysIs
For each player we recorded the points scored, number of actions, 
tools used, innovations discovered, how often innovations were 
employed, and which sub-innovations were used. An individual 
was assessed as having discovered an innovation if it was performed 
once or more. The number of discoveries of innovations provides a 
measure of how exploratory players were. To measure exploitation 
of innovations, we examined the number of times a given innova-
tion and its sub-innovations were used. High usage of a specific 
innovation indicates that a behavior has been adopted, i.e., incorpo-
rated in the repertoire of the participant. Data were analyzed using 
generalized linear models (GLMs) in R 2.9.2, with link functions 
and underlying error distributions chosen  according to Crawley 
Table 1 | Comparison between participants exposed to high-
performance cues, low-performance cues, or no cuesa.
Dependent variable High-cued Without-cues 
 players ± 95% CI ± 95% CI 
 (Cohen’s d) (Cohen’s d)
Points gained 1.21 ± 0.92* (d = 0.67) 0.08 ± 1.1 (d = 0.04)
Estimated score 0.90 ± 0.64* (d = 0.67) 1.23 ± 0.62* (d = 1.01)
Activity (keystrokes) 0.25 ± 0.24* (d = 0.52) −0.32 ± 0.28* (d = 0.6)
Discoveries of  0.88 ± 1.58 (d = 0.28) 0.93 ± 1.58 (d = 0.3) 
second innovation
Exploitations of second 1.38 ± 0.94* (d = 0.75) −0.06 ± 1.16 (d = 0.03) 
and third innovations
Uses of lowest-cost tool −0.24 ± 0.20* (d = 0.63) −0.12 ± 0.22 (d = 0.27) 
aFigures are coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the 
GLMs described in the Section “Results.” High-cued players and players that 
saw no cues were contrasted with low-cued players. This resulted in a baseline 
estimate of the dependent variable when players were exposed to low cues, 
with the deviations from this baseline for high-cued and without-cue players 
presented. Positive coefficient estimates thus indicate an increased response 
of players for the respective dependent variable compared to the low-cued 
treatment. Significant deviations (i.e., CIs do not encompass 0) from the 
low-cued treatment are in bold font and asterisked. All measures are continuous 
apart from discovery of the second innovation, which was binomial. Effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d) are given in brackets.
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To measure innovation exploitation rates, we totaled the num-
ber of times the sub-innovations of each innovation class were 
performed. All participants exploited the tool–object innovation, 
typically exploiting all four tool–object sub-innovations. High-cued 
participants exploited the tool–tool–object and object–object–object 
innovation classes more often than participants exposed to low or 
no cues [high cued: Mdn = 13.0, MAD = 19.3; low cued: Mdn = 3.0, 
MAD = 4.4; without-cues: Mdn = 5.5, MAD = 6.7, Figure 1B, GLM 
(quasipoisson errors, log link function): F(2, 61) = 9.3; p < 0.001; 
Table 1]. An identical pattern was observed when restricting the 
analysis of exploitation rate to those players that discovered at least 
two innovation classes, removing players that discovered only the 
tool–object innovation [F(2, 49) = 9.1; p < 0.001]. In summary, 
high-cued participants exploited innovations more than did low-
cued participants or participants that saw no cues, although their 
innovation discovery rates were similar.
High-cued players could have exploited a second or third 
innovation more because they discovered it earlier in the game. 
However, the time of discovery of the second innovation (measured 
in keystrokes since game start) did not significantly differ between 
players exposed to low, high, or no performance cues [high cued: 
Mdn = 53.0, MAD = 58.6; low cued: Mdn = 28.0 MAD = 34.1; no 
cues: Mdn = 26.0 MAD = 32.6, GLM (quasipoisson errors, log link 
 low-cued participants was significantly higher than without-cue 
participants [Figure 1A, high cued: Mdn = 275.1, MAD = 74.1; 
low cued: Mdn = 215.2, MAD = 109.4; without-cues: Mdn = 142.5, 
MAD = 40.0; GLM (quasipoisson errors, log link function): F(2, 
61) = 9.6; p < 0.001; Table 1].
socIal Influences on dIscovery versus exPloItatIon of 
InnovatIons
We distinguished between the initial performance of an innova-
tion (discovery) and its repeated use (exploitation). There were 
three classes of innovation that could be discovered and exploited 
(tool–object, tool–tool–object, and object–object–object: see above).
All players discovered the tool–object innovation, and always 
before any other innovation, thus social performance cues had no 
detectable effect on this first innovation. Similar numbers of par-
ticipants discovered a second innovation (either tool–tool–object or 
object–object–object) after exposure to high, low, or no performance 
cues (high cued: 18 of 21; low cued: 15 of 21; without-cues: 19 of 
22), and there were no significant differences in discovery rates 
[GLM (binomial errors, logit link function): difference in devi-
ance (χ2 distributed on 2 df) = 1.9, p = 0.38; Table 1]. Only one 
participant (of 64) discovered all three innovations, thus precluding 
separate analysis of the third innovation discovered.
FIgure 1 | High-performance cues (A) increase activity (measured as the 
number of tool-activating keystrokes during the game) and (B) exploitation of 
second and third innovations (measured as the total number of sub-innovations 
performed). (C) Low-performance cues lead to an increased usage of low cost 
tools. Boxplots indicate median line, 25 and 75th percentile, with whiskers 
denoting the 1.5 interquartile range and points indicating outliers.
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perception of high performance in other individuals appears to 
facilitate the exploitation of innovations, i.e., the adoption of a 
novel trait, rather than perception of low-performance depressing 
the exploitation of innovations.
Social cues of high performance (“social performance feed-
back”) can drive the adoption of innovations, at least in our experi-
mental setting. Social comparison theory has inspired extensive 
research addressing how people compare themselves with others 
and the outcomes of such self-comparison (Festinger, 1954; Buunk 
and Gibbons, 2007; Johnson and Stapel, 2007). Social comparison 
is widely observed in humans, with individual and cultural dif-
ferences, and has been linked to underlying neurocognitive sub-
strates (Buunk and Gibbons, 2007; Fliessbach et al., 2007). Social 
comparison can elicit increased performance (Gibbons et al., 2000; 
Huguet et al., 2001; Johnson and Stapel, 2007), even over and above 
an individual’s goal to improve personal performance (Gollwitzer, 
1999). However, we did not examine the typical research foci of 
social comparison studies, such as influences of the similarity or 
expertise of other individuals (Wheeler et al., 1997; Suls et al., 2002). 
Moreover, we did not set out to investigate whether the processes we 
describe are unique to the social domain. It is possible that asocial 
indicators of achievable performance may have produced identical 
results. For example, we could have informed players that the high-
scores they observed were produced by computer-controlled agents 
making random choices. Such asocial cues may be rare. In real-life 
situations performance indicators will typically only be available by 
individuals interacting with the world, meaning that performance 
indicators must come from individual exploration and exploita-
tion or from social cues. Many individual performance indictors 
are available, allowing individuals to assess performance without 
social cues. For example, deviation from past rates of personal suc-
cess (“historical performance feedback”) has received considerable 
empirical attention (e.g., Greve, 1998). However, social cues are also 
readily available and provide an efficient means to assess achiev-
able performance, particularly when success could be achieved in 
many domains and there are multiple measures of performance. 
For example, an author could be achieving 100% success in articles 
being accepted, but remain unaware of whether this was maximal 
performance. Social information could inform the author that 
others are publishing more papers, in better journals, expending 
less effort per article, or achieving in some other domain simulta-
neously. We demonstrate here that social performance indicators 
influence rates of individual exploitation. We suspect that social 
cues will be more salient and widely used than many asocial cues, 
but this is an issue for further empirical test.
A possible objection to our interpretation of this study is that 
the innovations we describe are insufficiently complex to provide 
data applicable to innovation in general. An area of controversy is 
how novel an act must be to qualify as innovation, and how this 
novelty can be objectively measured (Reader and Laland, 2003b). 
The observed behavioral changes are not highly novel once-in-a-
lifetime inventions, and would presumably be repeatedly discovered 
in populations, thus failing some definitions of true innovation 
(see discussion in Reader and Laland, 2003a; Ramsey et al., 2007). 
Moreover, we do not attempt to delimit the many neural and cog-
nitive processes potentially underlying the production and adop-
tion of innovations. For example, we cannot distinguish between 
function): F(2, 49) = 2.7; p = 0.08; players that did not discover a 
second innovation were excluded from the analysis]. Note that the 
(non-significant) pattern is opposite to that predicted by exploi-
tation frequency: high-cued participants discovered the second 
innovation later than other participants.
 tool use Preferences
Low-cued players used the lowest-cost tool more often, and the 
highest-cost tool less often, than expected by chance, whereas play-
ers exposed to high or no cues did not significantly deviate from 
random choice (Figure 1C). High-cued players used the lowest-cost 
tool less often than low-cued players but at a similar rate to without-
cue players [high cued: Mdn = 25.2%, MAD = 3.6%; low cued: 
Mdn = 26.7%, MAD = 5.2%; no cues: Mdn = 25.3%, MAD = 4.5%; 
GLM (quasibinomial errors, logit link function): F(2, 61) = 3.03, 
p = 0.05; Table 1].
dIscussIon
Individuals who were exposed to social indicators of high perfor-
mance were more active, exploited innovations more, and scored 
more points than did individuals exposed to low performance or 
no cues. High-cued individuals also expected that they would do 
better than individuals exposed to low-performance cues. However, 
social performance cues had no significant effects on rates of inno-
vation discovery. Thus cues of how others have performed had 
dramatic effects on the adoption of novel behavior patterns into 
an individual’s repertoire, even when the innovations themselves 
cannot be observed or copied and it is not known that innovation 
was the reason for another’s success. This suggests that innovations 
will be more likely to spread through groups when individuals see 
indicators that others are doing well.
Almost all individuals in our study discovered a second innova-
tion, but only those exposed to high-performance cues continued 
to use and exploit it. Thus individuals exposed to low-performance 
cues and to no cues were apparently less inclined to attend to new 
discoveries or to change their behavior, despite the fact that such 
discoveries resulted in a points yield 10-fold that previously expe-
rienced. This finding is all the more striking given that participants 
knew that more points led to increased compensation at the end 
of the game. The exact sequence of acts leading to the increased 
reward was likely unclear to the participants upon first discovery, 
so further exploration was needed to ascertain how to achieve this 
yield again, requiring further investment of points. Players exposed 
to low-performance cues avoided this investment. They appeared 
less willing to spend points, slightly preferring low cost tools, for 
example. Furthermore, their reported expectations were lower, 
arguably reflecting lower aspiration levels (goals) than high-cued 
players. A 100 point windfall would bring them near their mean 
expectation (1168 points) or the highest viewed score (1453 points). 
Moreover, they could beat the lowest viewed high-score by simply 
avoiding excessive loss of points. They may thus have been satisfied 
with a low rate of reward, and pursued a risk-averse strategy to 
avoid losing accumulated points. Compared to low-cued players, 
players that saw no performance cues had higher expectations (i.e., 
they predicted they would score more points) and did not avoid 
high-cost tools. However, like low-cued players, they did not exploit 
already discovered innovations as readily as high-cued players. Thus 
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